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“O! they have lived long on the alms-
basket of words”: Enhancing Efficacy 
and Reducing Cost by Limiting the Role 
of Law and Lawyers in Defamation 
Disputes
ANDREW SCOTT*
To triangulate the individual and social interests in reputation and free speech, the common 
law has generated an unwieldy corpus of technical rules and counterfactual assumptions. 
This complexity entails enormous cost and opportunities for game-playing by astute, 
well-resourced litigants. Neither reputation nor free speech is well-served by reform 
initiatives that focus mainly on amending the substantive law. This paper offers a critical 
assessment of a proposal that might better address complexity and cost. This comprises 
the inextricable combination of two initiatives: repeal of the ‘single meaning rule’ which 
promises to simplify the court’s task, but instead generates complexity in defiance of common 
sense; and a bar to claims should a publisher correct unintended meanings promptly and 
prominently. This combination would eliminate the ‘semantic’ dimension of claims; deliver 
adequate redress for many publication harms; see only intractable disputes reach the court; 
and leave defamation law more comprehensible to the wider public.
* Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. Love’s Labour’s 
Lost—from which the title of this article is drawn (V.I)—features the longest scene (V.II), the 
longest single word (“honorificabilitudinitatibus” at V.I.39-40), and—depending on editorial 
choices—the longest speech (IV.III.284-361) in all of Shakespeare’s plays.
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WORDS CAN CAUSE PROFOUND INJURY TO REPUTATION. They can do so in 
myriad ways. The principal function of defamation law is to protect reputations 
but to do so by adequately triangulating the individual and the social interests 
in reputation and free speech. This is an unforgiving task. To understand and 
address injuries caused by the use of language, the common law has generated 
an unwieldy corpus of highly technical rules that rests upon a broad sweep of 
counterfactual assumptions. The core problem with defamation law is attendant 
upon this juridification and over-complication of public sphere disputes. It is the 
sheer cost of embroilment in legal proceedings for both plaintiffs and defendants, 
and the opportunities that this creates for game playing by astute and relatively 
well-resourced litigants.
The chilling effect of defamation law is well-attested.1 During parliamentary 
debate on what became the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales,2 Lord 
May—a former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government and President of 
the Royal Society—described his own challenging experience of being threatened 
with a libel action. He reflected on the real dilemma he felt between raising 
concerns regarding a matter of public importance and facing court proceedings or 
censoring himself and thereby allowing such concerns to persist.3 A corresponding, 
1. In the mid-1990s, research undertaken by Barendt et al evidenced the existence of this 
chilling effect of defamation law on the full array of British media publishers. The chill might 
impact “directly” on the decision as to whether specific material would be published or 
broadcast, or structurally, to demarcate subjects that are simply never written about because 
of the inevitability of legal suit. See Eric Barendt et al, Libel and the Media: The Chilling 
Effect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). See also Frederick Schauer, “Fear, Risk and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect’” (1978) 58 BUL Rev 685.
2. Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26.
3. UK, HL Deb (17 December 2012), vol 741, col GC420 (Lord May of Oxford) 
[December 17 Debates].
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albeit much less recognized, concern is that in many jurisdictions, access to justice 
for relatively impecunious plaintiffs has become illusory. Neither reputation nor 
free speech is well-served by the modern law of defamation.
These may simply be intractable problems. They can also be viewed as 
concerns that might be raised in respect of any area of the civil law. When a body 
of law is unnecessarily technical, however, it can actively encourage practitioners 
to pursue complicating and expense-inducing tactics. In such circumstances, 
reconsideration seems both necessary and appropriate. Such reconsideration, 
responding to the problems of defamation chill and access to justice, accelerated 
in importance by the advent of social media and the democratization of speech 
that they allow, has been happening in many jurisdictions.4 There has been a 
general appreciation that defamation laws in the common law world are not fit 
for purpose in modern public spheres.5
Much of the recent effort expended in revising the law has focused on 
the possible revision of the substantive law. The Defamation Act 2013 passed 
in England and Wales included a broad range of such changes,6 but much of 
4. The significant momentum for reform has been evidenced in many jurisdictions throughout 
the latter part of the twentieth century, beginning with the decision by the US Supreme 
Court. See New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan]. Acheson and 
Wohlschlegel noted and detailed the fact that “[t]he recognition that defamation law can 
have a chilling effect on important expression has been influential in the development of 
the tort across the common law world.” David J Acheson & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, “The 
Economics of Weaponized Defamation Lawsuits” (2018) 47 Sw L Rev 335 at 337. See also, 
Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “The swing of the pendulum: reputation, expression and 
the re-centring of English libel law” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 27 at 28-34. Arguably, if taken 
too far, the desire to privilege freedom of speech—as in Sullivan—can create its own set 
of pathological consequences not just for the protection of reputation but also in terms of 
the expenditure of effort on verification and ultimately the social value of expression. See 
Acheson & Wohlschlegel, supra note 4 at 351-54.
5. Studies have been conducted in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. 
Additionally, studies are currently ongoing in Ontario and have been mooted in 
New South Wales.
6. Defamation Act 2013, supra note 2. The Defamation Act 2013 reemphasized that defamatory 
statements must cause “serious harm” if they are to be actionable; placed the main common 
law defences onto a statutory footing while revising them in small ways; updated and 
extended qualified privileges; introduced new defences for website operators; ensured that 
the limitation period for claims runs from the date of “first publication”; compelled courts to 
refuse jurisdiction if England and Wales were not “clearly the most appropriate place” for the 
action to be brought; ended the presumption of trial by jury, and provided for the court to 
order publication of summaries of judgments and to compel the “take-down” of impugned 
publications (ibid, ss 1-5, 7-9, 11-13). For general review and criticism of the Defamation Act 
2013, see Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Tilting at Windmills: the Defamation Act 2013” 
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this industry can be considered little more than tinkering at the edges. It tends 
to address only the symptoms of the underlying problems. Indeed, since the 
Defamation Act 2013 came into force, the English courts have been required to 
deal with protracted litigation over elements of the new law—often reinvigorating 
the ghosts of erstwhile common law rules while handing down their statutory 
interpretations—in a manner that can only be disturbing to the progenitors of 
the Defamation Act 2013.7
Lord May was prescient when warning of the dangers of focusing only on the 
minutiae of the law when contemplating possible reforms, advising the following:
[A]s we look at this, we should not look … through a purely legalistic prism. We 
should try to see a way forward to have sensible legislation that means that if you 
criticise on valid scientific grounds the chimerical claims of someone … you will 
not be confronted with the dilemma of principle that people are being confronted 
with now. … [T]he issues raised by the legalistic arguments that are not sensitive to 
the underlying facts are substantial and difficult to solve but need to be confronted.8
After proposals had been aired in the Parliamentary debate, Lord May’s 
frustration and disappointment were both palpable and portentous: “[W]hat is 
being described … [is] not easily going to be translated into anything that is not 
almost as expensive as what is currently being used as a weapon … [when most 
disputes] could have been settled by a judge in half an hour… .”9 It is the broader 
appreciation of this reality that has encouraged consideration of alternative forms 
of dispute resolution in the defamation context.10
(2014) 77 Mod L Rev 87; Gavin Phillipson, “The ‘global pariah’, the Defamation Bill and 
the Human Rights Act” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 149.
7. This has included protracted litigation through the appellate courts on the content of the 
s 1 serious harm test and of the s 4 defence of publication on a matter of public interest. 
For the s 1 serious harm test, see Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, [2017] EWCA Civ 1334 
[Lachaux]. It was heard by the Supreme Court in Autumn 2018. For the section 4 defence 
of publication on a matter of public interest, see Economou v de Freitas, [2016] EWHC 1853 
(QB), aff’d in [2018] EWCA Civ 2591.
8. December 17 Debates, supra note 3 (Lord May of Oxford).
9. Ibid. Lord May was referring specifically to the rule in clause 1 of the Bill (what became the s 
1 “serious harm” test), but might easily have been speaking more generally.
10. See e.g. Emily Laidlaw, “Are we asking too much from defamation law? Reputation systems, 
ADR, Industry Regulation and other Extra-Judicial Possibilities for Protecting Reputation in 
the Internet Age: Proposal for Reform” (2017) Law Commission of Ontario commissioned 
Papers on Defamation Law in the Internet Age; David S Ardia, “Reputation in a Networked 
World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law” (2010) 45 Harv CR-CLL Rev 
261; Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Reframing libel: taking (all) rights seriously and where 
it leads” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 5.
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The aim of this article is to explain, criticize, and ultimately to promote a 
reform option that might achieve Lord May’s goal of a more sensible regime design. 
Specifically, this option comprises the inextricable combination of two reforms; 
first, and perhaps counterintuitively, the withdrawal of the single meaning rule 
that common law courts deploy to simplify the range of legal questions that must 
be addressed in particular disputes; and secondly, the introduction of a bar to 
bringing claims where a publisher has made a correction or retraction promptly 
and prominently. This proposal was first floated in the consultation report 
published by the Northern Ireland Law Commission as part of its consideration 
of whether provisions equivalent to those of the Defamation Act 2013 should be 
introduced into Northern Irish law.11
The basic thinking underpinning the interlinked proposal can be briefly 
stated. In essence, it would extract the semantic dimension of defamation 
proceedings out of the legal context. The single meaning rule is intended to 
simplify the court’s task when resolving defamation claims. Its practical effect, 
however, is to see defamation claims often become highly technical, protracted, 
and costly exercises. As noted, it is the prospect of becoming embroiled in such 
a costly legal dispute that encapsulates the central problem of defamation law. 
The primary goal pursued by most bona fide plaintiffs is a prompt correction 
of falsehoods to vindicate their reputations. The second part of the proposed 
reform then would do much to afford suitable remedies to people who have 
seen their reputations sullied by inaccurate statements published by other parties. 
Importantly, it would do this before lawyers need become substantively involved. 
This should not create problems for responsible publishers, many of whom are 
committed to correcting inaccuracies when they are identified.12 Defendant 
publishers might be expected more often to publish corrections or retractions 
whenever appropriate and without recourse to formal systems of dispute 
resolution, and at the same time become willing and able to defend actions 
vigorously in court if they are convinced of the truth of what has been published. 
11. In the midst of its study on defamation, the Northern Ireland Law Commission was 
closed. The consideration of reform continued under a project overseen by the responsible 
Department of the Northern Ireland Executive. See UK, Department of Finance, Reform of 
defamation law in Northern Ireland, by Andrew Scott (Belfast: Crown copyright, 2016).
12. For an example of such a commitment, see Independent Press Standards Organisation, 
Editors’ Code of Practice, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation, 2016, s 1.
SCOTT,  ENHANCING EFFICACy AND REDUCING COST 85
Importantly, the recommended reform would also see defamation law become 
more comprehensible to the wider public.13
In the paragraphs that follow, this article describes and explains the two 
elements of the reform proposal. This involves consideration of, first, the single 
meaning rule, and, secondly, the proposed jurisdictional bar on claims where 
a publisher has made a correction or retraction promptly and prominently. 
Thereafter, consideration is given to a range of objections that have been raised 
over time to proposals of this nature, and specifically to the combined proposal 
mooted by the Northern Ireland Law Commission. The article concludes with 
reflections on the ramifications of the introduction of a proposal of the type 
considered, and the shift in context for the resolution of defamation disputes that 
this would entail.
I. A BIPARTITE REFORM PROPOSAL
If revisions to the basic parameters of the cause of action in defamation or to the 
available defences are unlikely properly to balance expression and reputation, 
then a more sensible and effective—although perhaps counter-intuitive—target 
for reform may be the longstanding ‘single meaning rule.’ This would be in 
conjunction with the introduction of a jurisdictional bar on claims based on 
meanings of publications that had been corrected or retracted promptly and 
prominently. Neither of these reforms is a panacea on its own. Indeed, instituted 
independently, the former might well generate chaos in legal proceedings. Any 
withdrawal of the single meaning rule that was not also coupled with further 
measures protective of the position of defendants would be a profound error. 
At present, the opportunity to give discursive remedies is often simply honoured 
in the breach. Through their combined adoption, however, it may be possible 
significantly to reduce the chilling effect of libel threats on people who seek to 
discover and disclose corruption and malpractice and to criticize the powerful; 
to ensure access to justice and incentivize the provision of adequate redress to 
people who have seen their reputations sullied by false or ambiguous statements 
made by others, and to diminish the costly involvement of law, lawyers, and the 
courts in many disputes.
13. The late Lord Bingham emphasized, as the first precept underpinning the rule of law, that 
“the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.” See Tom 
Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2010) at 37. See also Lord Bingham, “The 
Rule of Law” (2007) 66 Cambridge LJ 67 at 69.
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A. WITHDRAWAL OF THE SINGLE MEANING RULE
In most common law jurisdictions, “[w]hen a dispute is transposed from the 
public sphere to the courtroom, the ‘single meaning rule’ dictates that each set of 
“words complained of” must be understood to hold one meaning only.”14 In Lait 
v Evening Standard Ltd, the English and Wales Court of Appeal traced the origins 
of the rule back to the late nineteenth century.15 It was affirmed by the UK 
Parliament’s House of Lords in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd as being 
“too well established to require citation of authority,”16 while it was reaffirmed 
following the passing of the Defamation Act 2013 in Lachaux.17 Canadian courts 
have also acknowledged its applicability.18 Notwithstanding its unquestioned 
status, justifications for the rule have seldom been articulated by the courts.19
The rule entails that where the language of an impugned publication is 
ambiguous or uncertain, a single interpretation must be selected from among all 
those that can conceivably be inferred from what has been published. The aim is 
to make the court’s task more manageable; naturally, “dealing with one meaning 
only promises to make the task of the court more straightforward.”20 Yet, this is 
14. UK, Northern Ireland Law Commission, Consultation Paper Defamation Law in Northern 
Ireland (Belfast: Northern Ireland Law Commission, 2014) at para 5.03 [Northern Ireland 
Law Commission]. The exception is to be found in US jurisdictions. Little time tends to 
be spent on this issue in US litigation. One explanation may be that because in the United 
States the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and the standard of proof required is higher, 
there is an incentive for plaintiffs to present only obviously sustainable meanings to the 
court. The plaintiff “sets the stage” for the litigation with the meanings that are pleaded.
15. [2011] EWCA Civ 859 at para 31, citing Merivale v Carson, (1887) 20 QBD 275 at 279-82.
16. [1995] 2 AC 5 (HL (Eng)) at 71, [1995] 2 WLR 450, Bridge LJ [Charleston]. Its use was 
described as “unexceptionable.” See Bonnick v Morris & Ors (Jamaica), [2002] UKPC 31 at 
para 21 [Bonnick].
17. Lachaux, supra note 7 at 82.
18. It was noted that, as with the equivalent English defence and unlike the standard situation, 
the defence of responsible communication does not require preliminary rulings from the 
jury on primary meaning since it does not depend on the supposition of a single meaning. 
See Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at paras 124, 130. See also Hansen v Harder, 2010 
BCCA 482. In an anti-SLAPP motion, the court noted a range of possible meanings of 
the allegation that members of the Whitchurch-Stouffville Town Council were “in the 
pocket” of the plaintiff. See United Soils Management Ltd v Barclay, 2018 ONSC 1372 at 
paras 67, 68, 70.
19. An exception to this was a concurring judgment offered by Lord Neuberger in the Hong 
Kong Final Court of Appeal. See e.g. Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd, 
[2012] Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 59 at paras 138-46 [Oriental Daily]. For key 
elements of Lord Neuberger’s justification, see notes 42-43, 45-46, and accompanying text.
20. Northern Ireland Law Commission, supra note 14 at para 5.04.
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akin to mining for fool’s gold. Much of the technical complexity of defamation 
law can be located in the process of semantic parsing through which the single 
meaning is determined. As a result, the transposition of a dispute from the public 
sphere to the legal forum generates opportunities for costly game-playing by 
parties and their lawyers. The attempt to simplify matters by way of the single 
meaning rule is damagingly iatrogenic. It allows relatively wealthy litigants to 
outgun their opponents financially, irrespective of the merits of the case.
As the law stands, the argument over the meaning to be attributed to 
words is often a key element of a defamation action; determination of meaning 
is “very often if not always the most important issue.”21 Where the meaning 
can be determined at an early stage in proceedings, it is highly likely that the 
dispute will be settled. Neither the publisher’s intended meaning nor the actual 
inferences drawn by the audience for a given publication are important to the 
court’s function. Determination of meaning is not an empirical exercise.22 The 
test deployed by the court is that of how the words would have been understood 
by the ordinary, reasonable recipient of the publication in question. It is to 
be supposed that only a single interpretation would have been inferred by all 
ordinary, reasonable members of the audience of the publication. Once the 
court has selected this one meaning from all those available, the disposal of (that 
element of ) the case will rest upon that choice.
Plainly, the single meaning rule involves a legal abstraction from reality. This 
abstraction is often explicitly recognized by the courts. In Slim v Daily Telegraph, 
for instance, Lord Justice Diplock acknowledged:
Everyone outside a court of law recognises that words are imprecise instruments 
for communicating the thoughts of one man to another. The same words may 
be understood by one man in a different meaning from that in which they are 
understood by another and both meanings may be different from that which the 
author of the words intended to convey. … Where … words are published to the 
millions of readers of a popular newspaper, the chances are that if the words are 
reasonably capable of being understood as bearing more than one meaning, some 
readers will have understood them as bearing one of those meanings and some will 
have understood them as bearing others of those meanings.23
21. UK, HL & HC, Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill Oral and associated 
written evidence, vol II, HL Paper 203 & HC 903-II (London: Joint Committee, 
6 July 2011) at 466.
22. Hough v London Express Newspapers, Ltd, [1940] 2 KB 507 at 515. The exception is with 
“legal innuendo” cases. See Richard Parkes & Alastair Mullis, eds, Gatley on Libel and 
Slander, 2nd supplement, 12th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) at para 26.23.
23. [1968] 2 QB 157 at 171-73 [Slim].
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Lord Nicholls made a similar point in Bonnick:
Language is inherently imprecise. Words and phrases and sentences take their colour 
from their context. The context often permits a range of meanings, varying from the 
obvious to the implausible. Different readers may well form different views on the 
meaning to be given to the language under consideration.24
Indeed, some recipients of a publication will appreciate where its meaning is 
ambiguous and that competing interpretations are possible. They may reach no 
firm conclusion on the question of what the publisher was intending to convey. 
Language is complicated; communication often imprecise.
Of course, in simple cases, there may be little complexity involved. 
A publication may comprise an unambiguous allegation that is susceptible to 
only one possible interpretation. Alternatively, it may couple an anodyne, literal 
assertion with an essentially obvious second meaning that can be inferred from 
the words themselves. Such double entendres are referred to in law as ‘false’ or 
‘popular’ innuendo. Equally straightforward are those cases in which what has 
been published consists of an assemblage of distinct defamatory imputations. 
Each such imputation will be independently actionable and, in principle, must 
be separately defended should a plaintiff decide to bring proceedings thereon.25 
In any such scenario, the outcome of the case will be straightforward in concept. 
Each imputation is either substantially true or not, and the dispute will be 
determined by reference to the evidence that each party adduces.
Beyond such simple scenarios, however, the requirement that a single 
meaning of impugned words be identified has obliged the courts to develop highly 
complicated semantic tools with which to perform their interpretative function.26 
The range of complicating dimensions that might make the determination of 
meaning more difficult is broad. For instance, a number of apparently separate 
and distinct imputations might be interpreted as variations on the same general, 
24. Bonnick, supra note 16 at para 20.
25. A plaintiff accused of being a thief and an adulterer, for instance, might choose to sue on 
the accusation of adultery only, in which case the defendant cannot then seek to justify the 
charge of theft. “It is no defence to a charge that, ‘You called me A’ to say, ‘Yes, but I also 
called you B on the same occasion, and that was true.’” See Cruise v Express Newspapers 
plc, [1998] EWCA Civ 1269 at 954. See also Warren v The Random House Group Ltd, 
[2008] EWCA Civ 834.
26. For an overview, and a recent illustration of the complexity of the determination of meaning 
by a court, see Shakil-Ur-Rahman v Ary Network Ltd, [2015] EWHC 2917 (QB). See also 
Parkes & Mullis, supra note 22, ch 11.
SCOTT,  ENHANCING EFFICACy AND REDUCING COST 89
singular imputation,27 such that the seemingly separate allegations can read instead 
as involving a “common sting.”28 Another complication occurs where a set of 
words is capable of bearing a number of slightly differing, and progressively more 
serious, interpretations or “shades of meaning.”29 Similarly, an allegation might 
be interpreted as possessing a greater or lesser degree of certitude; in English law, 
these degrees are known as the “Chase-levels” of meaning.30 In addition, some 
members of the audience for a seemingly anodyne publication may possess some 
special, extraneous knowledge that informs their interpretation of what has been 
published in a manner unbeknown to the uninitiated. Such words are then said 
to bear a “legal innuendo” meaning for that particular segment of the audience.31 
In all of these scenarios, the insistence that the law identifies a single meaning of 
the words that have been published is highly problematic.
27. This is not the same as the circumstance in which a defendant relies in court on evidence of 
other examples of poor conduct, which were not alluded to in the publication, in order to 
prove a general imputation of which the specific published allegation is said to be illustrative. 
See e.g. Williams v Reason (1983), [1988] 1 WLR 96.
28. This is known as the Polly Peck justification defence. See Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford 
(1985), [1986] QB 1000 at 1032. For example, failure to prove one specific allegation 
of adultery on which the plaintiff sued did not undermine a defence of truth when 
other instances of adultery were proven. The “common sting” of the allegations—that of 
adulterous promiscuity—was substantiated, notwithstanding the specific error. The defence 
of truth or justification does not require every detail of an allegation to be proven so long 
as it can be shown to be “substantially true.” See Khashoggi v IPC Magazines Ltd, [1986] 
1 WLR 1412 (CA).
29. In such a case, the defendant will naturally seek to persuade the court to select a less serious 
but nonetheless available meaning as the basis on which the case should be determined. They 
will do this through a “Lucas-Box” pleading, which sets out the defence’s more conducive 
meaning for the court. See Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1985), [1986] 1 
WLR 147 (CA) [Lucas-Box]. A helpful example was included in the Northern Ireland Law 
Commission’s consultation paper, “the statement ‘X is helping police with their inquiries 
into a murder’ could be taken to mean any or all of the following: that X murdered someone 
else, that they were complicit in the murder, that they knew about the murder, that the 
police believe that they might know something about the murder or about its surrounding 
circumstances, or that they were a forensic psychologist involved in suspect profiling.” See 
UK, Northern Ireland Law Commission, supra note 14, n 303.
30. Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 at para 45. These 
“Chase-levels” of allegation are: (i) that the plaintiff is guilty of X; (ii) that there are grounds 
to suspect that the plaintiff is guilty of X; and (iii) that there are grounds for investigating 
whether the plaintiff is guilty of X.
31. This is the only scenario in which the purportedly defamatory meaning of a libel must be 
empirically supported by adduced evidence as to what additional knowledge the particular 
segment of the audience had to handle, and hence how the published words would have been 
understood by them.
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Given that the court is tasked with selecting only one from among the array 
of possible meanings available in what has been published, complex rules and 
practice as to how the pleading of meanings should proceed have also developed 
in most common law jurisdictions. Early in the litigation, the plaintiff must 
specify the defamatory meaning that they believe the contested words hold. 
This tends to involve the pleading of only a narrow range of ‘serious’ meanings. 
It may also see the plaintiff offer different interpretations in the alternative. The 
plaintiff’s pleaded meaning does not bind the court.32 In response to the plaintiff’s 
case, the defendant will generally offer a lesser meaning.33 The plaintiff is then 
free to offer additional arguments related to meanings raised in the defence.
Together, the complexity of language and the rules on pleading meanings 
entail that both sides in litigation are incentivized poorly by the existing law. The 
context created by the single meaning rule is such that parties are encouraged to 
enter into a semantic game. Obfuscation and complication become a worthwhile 
exercise. Plaintiffs are encouraged to ‘plead high’ on meanings. The insight, once 
afforded by an interviewee to Professor Andrew Kenyon, is almost certainly 
generalizable to all defamation practitioners:
[W]hen I get a claim, I would have a look at that article and do two things. One is 
I would form my own view [about its meaning], as any person in the world would. 
… And the second thing I’d do is [ask] what meaning can I extract out of it which is 
most helpful to my clients. The two things are often quite different.34
Defendants are discouraged from addressing concerns raised and from 
mollifying complainants quickly and effectively should a grievance prove justified. 
Thus, much argument between parties is focused on meaning. Each litigant fights 
for the prize that the court will select a meaning that is favourable to their side. The 
tenor of defamation proceedings becomes one of strategy and semantics, rather 
32. See Lucas-Box, supra note 29 at 153, Ackner LJ. English courts will not, however, find 
that the words bear a meaning more serious than that contended for. See Cook v Telegraph 
Media Group Ltd, [2011] EWHC 1134 (QB) at para 11. See generally Andrew T Kenyon, 
Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (London: UCL Press, 2006) at 54-60 (which 
includes a comparison with the position in Australia) [Kenyon, Defamation]. A caveat exists 
in relation to pleaded legal innuendo meanings (ibid at 54).
33. This must be done with sufficient particularity to allow the plaintiff to understand the case 
that is faced. See e.g. Lord Ashcroft v Foley, [2011] EWHC 292 (QB).
34. See Kenyon, Defamation, supra note 32 at 119-20 (citing a private interview). Furthermore, 
on the strength of interviewees’ comments, Kenyon notes that the meanings pleaded by 
defendants are often verbose and general, not because the lawyers wish to establish those 
meanings per se, but rather because the general meaning provides a wider gateway to 
evidence (ibid at 120).
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than the attempt to address any core dispute. Costs are significantly increased. 
Yet, in the absence of the single meaning rule, the determination of meaning issue 
and the complicated associated rules on pleading would effectively disappear.
Outside of those cases in which the meaning of an imputation is unambiguous, 
application of the single meaning rule will involve not only an abstraction from 
reality and an opportunity for game-playing, but also some measure of injustice. 
This fact was highlighted by the English Court of Appeal in Ajinomoto Sweeteners:
If the single meaning rule does achieve a fair balance in defamation law between 
the parties’ competing interests, that would appear to be the result of luck rather 
than judgment … . The application of the rule can also be said to carry with it the 
potential for swinging the balance unfairly against one party [or] the other, resulting 
in no compensation in cases when fairness might suggest that some should be due, 
or in over-compensation in others.35
A similar point has been made in the South Australian Supreme Court: 
“[T]o insist upon an innocent interpretation where any reasonable person could, 
and many reasonable people would, understand a sinister meaning is to refuse 
reparation for a wrong that has in fact been committed.”36 As indicated by the 
English Court of Appeal in Ajinomoto, the converse also applies.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that in answering the question of whether 
the single meaning rule should be extended to the tort of malicious falsehood, 
the unanimous English Court of Appeal in Ajinomoto offered an excoriating 
critique.37 In the course of the judgment, Lord Justice Rimer reflected that “if 
the single meaning rule did not exist, I doubt if any modern court would invent 
it, either for defamation or any other tort.”38 Lord Justice Sedley described it as 
“anomalous, frequently otiose and, where not otiose, unjust.”39 Even in Slim, 
a case which is invariably cited as an affirmation of the single meaning rule, Lord 
35. Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v ASDA Stores Ltd, [2010] EWCA Civ 609 (QB) at para 
43, Rimer LJ [Ajinomoto].
36. Entienne Pty Ltd and Cosenza v Festival City Broadcasters Pty Ltd, [2001] SASC 60 at para 41.
37. Ajinomoto, supra note 35.
38. Ibid at para 43.
39. Ibid at para 31. The single meaning rule has also been rejected in the context of European 
trademark law in respect of the issue of whether there might be confusion between 
commercial signs or symbols among consumers. In debunking the proposition that such 
a rule should be applied, Justice Arnold noted that he was “not aware of any textbook or 
academic commentary which supports the existence of a single meaning rule in trade mark 
law. Nor am I aware of any authority from the superior courts of the other member states to 
support the existence of such a rule.” See Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc, [2013] EWHC 
1291 (Ch) at para 221. Moreover, Justice Arnold added that “the single meaning rule which 
exists in English defamation law is widely regarded as anomalous” (ibid at para 224).
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Justice Diplock described the law of defamation as “artificial and archaic” in this 
respect.40 Commentators have described it as a legal fiction the existence of which 
“owes much to accidents of history rather than legal principle or policy.”41
In the face of this analysis, the reasons why the law has embraced a rule 
that generates a focus on counterfactual artifice instead of plain fact must be 
powerful. In Oriental Daily, Lord Neuberger articulated the counter-argument. 
He maintained that any simple jettisoning of the single meaning rule would 
generate turmoil in defamation proceedings; withdrawal of the rule would 
“self-evidently lead to chaos and uncertainty in many cases.”42 His motivation 
in delivering what was merely a concurring judgment was to reassert that the 
single meaning rule is an “essential” feature of defamation law that “makes 
obvious good sense.”43 In Lait v Evening Standard Ltd, Lord Justice Laws 
concurred, unapologetically describing the rule as “a fiction adopted by the law 
for practical reasons.”44
Lord Neuberger strongly favoured retention of the extant rule. A pragmatic 
concern was that the rule’s removal would “lead to greater uncertainty in 
outcome … [as] [i]nstead of a statement with two possible meanings giving rise 
to a problem requiring a binary resolution, it would give rise to a problem which 
had a multiplicity of potential answers, along what might be seen as a continuous 
spectrum.”45 The judge warned that the abolition of the rule would “lead to the 
dispiriting, expensive, and time-consuming prospect of many witnesses being 
called by each party, to explain how they understood the statement in question.”46 
Thus, Lord Neuberger considered that removing the single meaning rule would 
see the determination of disputes become by degrees more complex and costly 
than at present.
It is difficult to contest the charge that any retention of numerous meanings 
in defamation actions would become cumbersome and unfair. This would be 
particularly the case in circumstances where a publisher simply did not intend 
40. Slim, supra note 23 at 171.
41. Alistair Mullis & Cameron Doley, eds, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy, 6th ed (London: 
LexisNexis, 2010) at 80.
42. Oriental Daily, supra note 19 at para 141.
43. Ibid. This was presumably done in response to the decision of the England and Wales Court 
of Appeal in Ajinomoto. See Ajinomoto, supra note 35.
44. [2011] EWCA Civ 859 at para 19.
45. Oriental Daily, supra note 19 at para 142.
46. Ibid. For a similar point made in another judgement, see Charleston, supra note 16 at 71.
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the more damaging interpretations.47 Publishers would be forced to placate 
plaintiffs swiftly with obsequious settlements, corrections, and apologies, where 
unintended or multiple meanings could be inferred, or both. This would clearly 
give plaintiffs an undeserved whip-hand.
While this is a serious concern, two points can be posited in response. 
First, and somewhat tritely, Lord Neuberger’s argument ignores the convoluting 
manner in which pleading and argument over meaning in libel cases is 
undertaken at present. The more important response is that it may be possible to 
ensure that only contested meanings—interpretations that the defendant asserts 
positively to be true which the plaintiff insists is false—are ever considered by 
the court. By way of pragmatic intervention, other meanings might be effectively 
excluded in advance of proceedings. Disputes generated by loose language or 
misinterpretation might be quickly resolved. Thus, Lord Neuberger’s concerns 
need not be a reason to retain the counterfactual single meaning rule.48
Coupling the removal of the single meaning rule with the introduction of 
appropriate discursive remedies and a jurisdictional bar would give swift access 
to justice for plaintiffs while providing an attractive “way out” for defendants. 
That is, the law would recognize, applaud, and promote moves by publishers to 
present discursive solutions to disputes triggered by their publications. A large 
proportion of disputes might be eliminated from the legal forum. Cases that 
involved some fundamental dispute of fact would still go to court, but the time 
and cost normally expended on determining meaning would be saved, and 
the dispute processed more efficiently. Engagement in the public sphere, and 
not bowdlerizing legal chill, might become the normal process through which 
disputes would be resolved. Lord Neuberger’s nightmare vision of horrifically 
complex litigation would simply not arise.
B. CORRECTIONS, RETRACTIONS, AND THE JURISDICTIONAL BAR
A primary goal pursued by plaintiffs when undertaking actions in defamation is 
to “set the record straight”; plaintiffs often wish most acutely to obtain a swift 
47. Anecdotally, this was the experience in New South Wales prior to the Defamation Act 2005. 
See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), 2005/77. As the cause of action rested upon possible 
imputations, publishers were sometimes left to defend meanings that they had never 
contemplated when publishing the impugned words.
48. Insofar as Lord Neuberger’s concerns related specifically to whether removal of the rule would 
complicate the determination of appropriate damages awards, they are considered below.
(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL94
correction of any inaccurate allegations regarding themselves.49 The general 
preference for a discursive remedy is also recognized in the English Pre-Action 
Protocol for Defamation which states that “almost invariably, a Claimant will 
be seeking an immediate correction and/or apology as part of the process of 
restoring his/her reputation.”50 Yet, in defamation law, the primary mechanism 
available to achieve vindication of a sullied reputation is an award of damages 
often made at the end of lengthy litigation. In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome, Lord 
Hailsham justified this approach to vindication as being necessary lest “the libel, 
driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at some future date … . 
[The damages award would allow the claimant] to point to a sum awarded by a 
jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge.”51 While 
the symbolic value of damages can no doubt be deployed to serve this function, 
it seems hardly to represent the best means of achieving vindication.
Damages are a poor means of securing vindication for two reasons.52 First, 
the award of damages will not of itself highlight the errors that have been 
published. When claims are settled, the damages afforded are invariably coupled 
with some other mechanism—such as the publication of a correction and/or an 
apology or the making of a public “statement in open court”—that is designed to 
enhance the extent of vindication achieved.53 The efficacy of damages as a means 
of securing vindication is also undermined by the fact that, when a case progresses 
to a court judgment, there will generally have been a substantial time-lag of 
several months—if not years—between the original publication and the award of 
damages. If the truth can be aired and misrepresentations corrected swiftly and 
publicly, this will plainly be a more effective way of achieving vindication for the 
person whose reputation has been unfairly traduced.
49. This fact was regularly asserted by plaintiffs’ lawyers during the debates on libel reform that 
culminated in the Defamation Act 2013 in England and Wales. Plaintiffs’ preference for 
correction over some financial windfall was also a core finding of the Iowa Libel Research 
project. See Randall P Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg & John Soloski, “Libel Law and the Press: 
Setting the Record Straight” (1985) 71 Iowa L Rev 215; Randall P Bezanson, “The Libel Suit 
in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get” (1986) 74 Cal L Rev 789.
50. UK, Ministry of Justice, Pre-action Protocol for Defamation, online: <www.justice.gov.uk/
courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_def> [perma.cc/8XKH-GM6U], at para 1.4.
51. [1972] AC 1027 (HL (Eng)) at 1071.
52. Damages also serve to compensate for hassle and injury to feelings, for the unquantifiable 
harm to reputation, and potentially for any attributable special losses.
53. Section 1(v) of the Editors’ Code of Practice overseen by the IPSO—the UK press 
self-regulator—provides similarly that “[a] publication must report fairly and accurately the 
outcome of an action for defamation to which it has been a party.” See Independent Press 
Standards Organisation, supra note 12, s 1(v).
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Reliance on damages as a means of obtaining vindication is also highly 
problematic on account of the sheer cost to plaintiffs of pursuing that device. The 
average prospective plaintiff is likely excluded altogether from access to justice 
in this respect. For those who can afford to sue, there is always the risk that the 
claim will be unsuccessful and that the plaintiff must then carry additional costs. 
Moreover, any damages award may be insufficient to meet the proportion of 
the costs bill that even a successful plaintiff would be obliged to meet. It may 
be to stereotype, but it is easy to understand why the first question asked by 
publishers following receipt of a complaint is whether their opponent can afford 
to sue and not whether an allegation is well-founded and underpinned by 
sustainable evidence.54
Common law jurisdictions are comparatively unusual in not providing swift 
discursive remedies for defamation as standard. This is not to suggest that such 
remedies are never available. In some circumstances, provision has been made 
by statute in England and Wales.55 Moreover, a number of innovative provisions 
54. See UK, HL Deb (17 December 2012), vol 741, col 442-443 (Lord Triesman). Speaking 
during the Committee Stage debate in the UK Parliament’s House of Lords on the 
Defamation Bill, Lord Triesman noted:
When corporations, particularly wealthy corporations, decide to become claimants, defendants 
cannot match their power with any equality of arms. It is also not at all infrequent that the 
claimant finds that they have no equality of arms with the defendant. If you find yourself 
contesting one of the major newspaper groups, it will tell you in pretty brusque terms that if 
you really want to bankrupt yourself, to see yourself and your family in penury for very many 
years, to lose your house or so on, just come on if you feel strong enough (ibid).
55. Some such measures are provided under the Defamation Act 1996. See See Defamation 
Act 1996 (UK), c 31. Under the summary procedure provided by sections 8-10, there is a 
power for the court to make a declaration of falsity and to order that the defendant publish a 
suitable correction and apology (if the parties cannot agree on the content of the apology or 
correction, however, all the court can then do is to order the defendant to publish a summary 
of its judgment) (ibid, ss 8-10). If the defendant wishes to take advantage of the “offer of 
amends” procedure set out in sections 2-4, they must offer a suitable correction and apology, 
and the availability of qualified privilege for certain reports under section 15 depends on the 
defendant-publisher being willing to publish a reasonable statement from the plaintiff by way 
of explanation or contradiction (ibid, ss 2, 9, 15). The Defamation Act 2013 includes two 
further powers that fall within this area; the section 12 power for a court to order a summary 
of its judgment to be published, and the section 13 power to order the “take-down” of a 
defamatory statement. See Defamation Act 2013, supra note 2, ss 12-13.
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have been introduced in the Republic of Ireland.56 Canadian jurisdictions 
have adopted apology legislation to ensure that such actions are not treated as 
admissions of liability.57 Antipodean jurisdictions have generally been slow to 
adopt such measures.58 Where they do exist, these provisions tend to require 
an application to a court, however. In contrast, most European (and many 
non-European) states have right of reply and correction provisions that apply in 
the context of publications disputes, of which many can be deployed more or less 
immediately upon the publication of a falsehood.59 Indeed, discursive remedies 
are the primary mechanism utilized in resolving defamation-style disputes.60
It has long been considered that discursive remedies—corrections, 
retractions, rights of reply, and apologies—are potentially of great utility in the 
defamation context.61 The likely efficacy of such tools has grown enormously 
56. Section 28 of the Defamation Act 2009 provides for an application to be made to the court 
for a declaratory order that a published statement is false and defamatory. An order will be 
made if the court finds that the statement is defamatory, and the publisher has no arguable 
defence and has failed to make an apology, correction or retraction. The applicant is not 
required to prove that the statement was false. If an order is made, the applicant may not 
bring any other proceedings in respect of the publication. See Defamation Act 2009 (NI), 
s 28. Section 30 of the Defamation Act 2009 allows a court to direct the publication of a 
correction in such a manner as will ensure “that it is communicated to all or substantially all 
of those persons to whom the defamatory statement was published” (ibid, s 30).
57. See e.g. Apology Act, SO 2009, c 3.
58. David Rolph, “A critique of the national, uniform defamation laws” (2008) 16 Torts LJ 207; 
Nina Khouri, “Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word: The Case for Apology Legislation in 
New Zealand” (2014) 2014 NZLR 603.
59. For a survey of international and national discursive remedies, see Kyu Ho Youm, “The Right 
of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An International and Comparative Perspective” (2008) 
76 Geo Wash L Rev 1017; John G Fleming, “Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies 
for Defamation” (1978) 12 UBC L Rev 15; Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 256-79.
60. See The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog, “Libel, Damages and Declarations 
of Falsity” (2 November 2010), online (blog): Inforrm’s Blog <www.inforrm.org/2010/11/02/
libel-damages-and-declarations-of-falsity> [perma.cc/ED44-PJ83]. See generally Gert 
Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi & Patrick O’Callaghan, eds, Personality Rights in 
European Tort Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); Helmut Koziol, “The 
Protection of Personality Rights against Invasions by Mass Media: Summary and Outlook” 
in Helmut Koziol & Alexander Warzilek, eds, Persönlichkeitsschutz gegenüber Massenmedien 
(Vienna: Springer-Verlag/Wien, 2005) 681.
61. See e.g. Fleming, supra note 59; Randall P Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg & John Soloski, 
Libel Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1987); Andrew T 
Kenyon, “Protecting Speech in Defamation Law: Beyond Reynolds-Style Defences” (2014) 
6 J Media L 21.
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in the context of online and social media communications.62 In many respects, 
they are already commonplace in the common law world. It is a tenet of good 
journalism that errors should be corrected.63 Their use is haphazard, however, and 
their availability as a matter of law is limited.
Not all discursive remedies are created equal, however; some options may 
be better suited than others to facilitate the speedy resolution of disputes in the 
context of ambiguous publications. Rights of reply, retractions and corrections, 
and apologies are each different in character. A plaintiff has the opportunity to 
“set the record straight” by taking up a right of reply, but this device does not 
also involve any necessary admission on the part of a publisher that what has 
been said was inaccurate. Compulsory rights of reply have often been deemed 
inapposite in common law jurisdictions as they compel publishers to dedicate 
space to the speech of others.64 Sincere apologies can sometimes address the hurt 
felt by a plaintiff but, when mandated, they invite cynicism both in their use and 
their reception.65
In contrast, a voluntary retraction or correction provided promptly and 
prominently, with its explicit recognition of error, would often—perhaps 
generally—be sufficient to provide a good measure of vindication.66 Ensuring 
that the truth is fully and quickly aired and misrepresentations corrected is likely 
to be the most effective way of vindicating a person’s reputation. A compelled 
62. See generally Ardia, supra note 10.
63. The Editors’ Code of Practice states that “[a] significant inaccuracy, misleading statement 
or distortion must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, and—where 
appropriate—an apology published.” See Independent Press Standards Organisation, supra 
note 12, cl 1(ii). Similarly, clause 3 of the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct 
provides that “[a] journalist … [d]oes her/his utmost to correct harmful inaccuracies.” See 
National Union of Journalists, Code of Conduct, London: NUJ, 2011, cl 3. Interestingly, 
The Guardian newspaper provides an automatic right of reply to any person mentioned 
in a published article. See “Response,” online: The Guardian <www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/series/response> [perma.cc/PDW3-XN73]. Broadcasters can be compelled 
by Ofcom—UK’s communications regulator—to carry summaries of fairness and 
standards complaints and the regulator’s adjudications. See Broadcasting Act 1996 (UK), 
c 55, ss 119-20.
64. Indeed, the Convention-compliance of mandating (or failing to mandate) such opportunities 
is moot. See Ronan Ó Fathaigh, “The Recognition of a Right of Reply under the European 
Convention” (2012) 4 J Media L 322. See also András Koltay, Freedom of Speech: The 
Unreachable Mirage (Budapest: CompLex, 2013), c 2.
65. UK, HL & HC, Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill Oral and associated written 
evidence Volume II (HL Paper 203 & HC 930-II, 2011) at 455-56. See specifically the 
comments of Desmond Browne QC and Hugh Tomlinson QC.
66. For recognition of this general principle, see Cooke v MGN Ltd, [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB).
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payment of damages following a protracted and contested legal dispute is certain 
to deliver less effective vindication than a positive intervention in the public 
sphere of this nature that also served to pre-empt litigation.
Nevertheless, when publishers are not compelled to correct or retract 
erroneous allegations, it might reasonably be expected—discounting ethical 
rectitude—that they might not take the trouble. To incentivize the use of such 
tools, the proposal here is that the law should provide that the prompt and 
prominent correction or retraction of an error following receipt of a complaint 
would obviate the possibility of any further action in respect of the meaning 
in question.67 Publishers would be afforded the opportunity to publish a 
correction or retraction through the introduction of a requirement that plaintiffs 
communicate details of the imputations complained of and the meaning ascribed 
to the words in question to the publisher in advance of bringing any action. 
Alongside the ability to assess the capability of any meanings over which remedial 
action was not taken by the publisher, a residual power to determine whether 
the complained of meaning had been properly corrected before any action could 
proceed could be afforded to the court. The basic scheme envisaged here is 
represented in the figure, below.68
67. One might also envisage the introduction of a cap on damages—not a bar to proceedings—
in circumstances where the defendant-publisher had offered a prompt and prominent right 
of reply to the aggrieved subject of a story. Given that a right of reply does not involve any 
recognition or highlighting of an error in what was alleged by the publisher, it cannot fairly 
be treated in the same way as a correction or retraction. See Television New Zealand Ltd v Ah 
Koy, [2002] 2 NZLR 616 (NZCA) at 617.
68. UK, Northern Ireland Law Commission, supra note 14 at 88.
SCOTT,  ENHANCING EFFICACy AND REDUCING COST 99
The potential benefits of a scheme of this nature can be illustrated 
by reference to the imaginable outcomes in cases involving ambiguous or 
multifarious potential meanings. In a case involving Chase-levels of meaning, 
for example, the complainant might suggest that all three levels of meaning 
could be taken from a publication.69 The publisher, having received a complaint, 
might respond that the form of words used could not tenably be interpreted as 
possessing the most serious meaning, (A). On reflection, they might agree that 
the words could be understood as an allegation of reasonable suspicion, (B), even 
though (perhaps) no such meaning had been intended. They might also explain 
that it had been intended only to suggest that there was a need for the matter 
discussed to be further investigated, (C). Under the regime suggested here, the 
publisher might promptly and prominently disseminate a note stating that there 
had been no intention to suggest (A) or (B), and thereby provide vindication 
on those meanings.70 They might also indicate that it is not considered tenable 
that (A) could be inferred, and—importantly—that (C) absolutely was intended. 
If the complainant then still wished to litigate on meaning (C), this would still 
69. For more thorough discussion of the Chase-levels, see supra note 30. Similar exercises 
might be conducted in respect of the scenario where “shades of meaning” can be inferred 
from a publication.
70. If the publisher merely ignored the complaint as it related to meaning (A) thinking that it 
was an over-stretched interpretation, the complainant could sue but it might be expected that 
a judge would strike out the action on the basis that the meaning was simply not capable of 
being inferred from what was published.
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be possible. Overall, such an action would reflect a honing of the dispute onto 
the territory of the allegation made and intended.71 This narrowing would be 
accomplished without recourse to court, and without any expensive technical 
lawyering on the pleading of meanings.
Other instances of publications with complex or multifarious meanings 
would also be easily managed so as to focus attention quickly on core disputes of 
fact. For example, in any—verging on hypothetical—case in which a complainant 
considered it important to differentiate between individual allegations that 
carried a common sting—“I may be an adulterer, but I was not unfaithful with 
that man”—the publisher could retract the particular contentious allegation if its 
veracity could not be adequately evidenced while simultaneously affirming the 
general allegation. Moreover, Lucas-Box pleadings would become an artifact of 
legal history as the dissecting of ‘shades of meaning,’ and the correction of any 
unintended misrepresentation would occur before legal proceedings were initiated. 
Responsible publishers would be liable to suit only on meanings that they chose 
to sustain and would proceed into litigation without having to prepare argument 
on anything other than their intended meaning. It would allow publishers to 
have the court cut to the chase and deal with a claim exclusively on this basis.
II. POSSIBLE CRITICISM OF THE REFORM PROPOSAL
The withdrawal of the single meaning rule combined with the introduction of a 
jurisdictional bar to claims where a publisher has made a correction or retraction 
promptly and prominently might often provide for plaintiffs to secure adequate 
redress without recourse to law, while also significantly reducing the chilling 
effect of potential claims on publishers. Yet, the proposal can be criticized on 
a range of grounds. When floated by the Northern Ireland Law Commission, 
a similar proposal generated only a small number of substantive comments from 
respondents to the consultation.72
71. Logically, the complainant would then have to spell out how any significant harm could 
have been caused by meaning (C) when that impliedly attributed by him or her to meanings 
(A) and (B) had been excluded. This would incentivise plaintiffs to “go in low,” or perhaps 
“realistically,” in the original letter of complaint.
72. UK, Andrew Scott, “Review of defamation law - summary of consultation responses” 
(2012) at 127, online (pdf ): Department of Finance <www.finance-ni.gov.uk/publications/
review-law-defamation> [perma.cc/ST39-7AG7] (each of the responses were then reiterated 
by a number of “coat-tailing” respondents to the consultation) [Scott, Summary of 
Consultation Responses].
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The tenor of these responses differed quite markedly as between those 
respondents who represented the interests of recurrent, media publishers—
notably the Media Lawyers Association (“MLA”)—and those who mainly 
represented non-traditional libel defendants. In the latter category, the Libel 
Reform Campaign response suggested that the combined proposal “has merit” 
and that it “could significantly reduce costs and the chill from legal bullying.”73 
It emphasized the need to couple such reform with the introduction of revised 
versions of the main defamation defences “to give the publisher the confidence 
to defend their actual stated intention (even after it has been narrowed thanks 
to this procedure).”74 It also pondered whether reform in this direction might be 
exploitable by vexatious litigants.75 The response of the MLA, in contrast, indicated 
strong opposition to the mooted proposal. It stated that the proposal “would be 
highly damaging to the proper and necessary exercise of freedom of expression 
by all members of society within Northern Ireland and … if implemented, may 
well be incompatible with Article 10 [of the] [European Convention on Human 
Rights].”76 It added that “[t]he scheme is impractical and would have real and 
harmful consequences for the media and publishers generally in Northern Ireland 
and in the United Kingdom.”77 Specific criticisms offered in the MLA response 
are included in the following discussion, below, alongside more long-standing 
objections to proposals of the nature outlined above.
A. SUPERFLUITY
A first criticism that can be made of the proposed reform is that it is essentially 
unnecessary. This might be especially the case if there is procedural provision 
for the single meaning of a publication to be determined at an early stage in 
litigation. The early determination of meaning at a preliminary hearing has 
become a ubiquitous feature of defamation litigation in England and Wales, 
one accelerated by the introduction of the seemingly ironbound presumption 
against jury trials by the Defamation Act 2013. Similarly, it can be the focus 
of a preliminary ruling from the jury in Canadian jurisdictions. When the 
determination of meaning is not left to a jury at the end of a trial process, the 
parameters of the dispute that must be argued before the court can be narrowed 
to the benefit of all parties. Indeed, it can be supposed that such determinations 
73. Ibid at 83.
74. Ibid at 84.
75. Ibid at 83.
76. Ibid at 114.
77. Ibid.
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will often result in the subsequent resolution of claims, one way or the other, 
without the need subsequently to go to full trial.78
This is to observe matters through a highly conditioned, legalistic prism. 
Recent preliminary hearings that have been conducted by the High Court in 
London have often coupled the determination of meaning with other preliminary 
questions such as whether the section 1 serious harm threshold has been satisfied 
and whether the statement complained of comprises allegations of fact or of 
opinion. Even the determination of preliminary issues by a court can sometimes 
generate such very significant legal costs that it becomes financially prohibitive 
for many potential plaintiffs to pursue legal action. Time is a further factor. 
The delay between the date when publication occurs and the date on which 
the court’s judgment on the determination of meaning is handed down can be 
several months, even years, in duration. The contrast with the almost immediate 
clarification of contested meanings—and correction or retraction of meanings 
that the publisher did not wish to stand by—under the proposed scheme is 
telling. Indeed, there is a certain incongruity in attaching the label “early” to the 
determination of meaning by the court.79 The wider point is that transposing 
the task of fixing on contested meanings to any court process necessarily results 
in stasis—setting the dispute in aspic—and denies the plaintiff access to swift 
vindication on capable meanings.
In this light, it is very difficult to concur with any suggestion that the need 
to dedicate time and resources to the determination of meaning under existing 
litigation practice is at all proportionate. Moreover, the fact that it is left to the 
court to determine meanings has the result that it can become tactically sensible 
for litigators to pursue actions that could be resolved at an earlier stage. It must 
be remembered that the task the court is currently required to undertake is only 
the determination of the meaning(s) that would be inferred by the ordinary 
reasonable person on a fairly superficial reading of the publication concerned. 
This plainly does not require legal or judicial expertise; quite the opposite, in fact.
78. By way of example, see RBOS Shareholders Action Group Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 
[2014] EWHC 130 (QB) at paras 5-6.
79. In its response to Northern Ireland’s consultation, MLA noted that the time taken to 
determine meaning in two early cases brought under the Defamation Act 2013 was 179 days 
after publication in one and, in the other case, 138 days after the claim was issued. This was 
done to contest an average figure across the previous ten years of 499 days that had been 
included in the Northern Ireland Law Commission’s report. See UK, Northern Ireland Law 
Commission, supra note 14 at para 5.28. This small sample clearly suggests that matters have 
improved—as one would expect—under the Defamation Act 2013. It does not indicate that 
the problem identified has been in any way resolved.
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The single meaning rule makes sense only if it is first assumed that this 
task must be undertaken in court. Then, the desirability of narrowing the 
issues between the parties to be determined by the court becomes obvious. This 
assumption is far from sensible in most cases, however. Far from simplifying 
proceedings, the single meaning rule complicates massively the transposition of 
a dispute from the public sphere into the courtroom. This is in the interests only 
of litigants—whether defendants or plaintiffs—who consider that they might 
benefit tactically from complicating and prolonging a given dispute.
B. GAMING THE SYSTEM: DEFENDANTS
A second criticism that can be made of the proposed reform is that meaningful 
vindication would not be achieved for plaintiffs if it became habitual for 
publishers simply to retract meanings on every occasion that a complaint was 
brought irrespective of whether the publisher had in fact intended the meaning. 
This is a potential concern. The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights has warned that such approaches may promote irresponsible journalism if 
publishers were willing simply to publish and correct as necessary.80
There are two potential guards against the cynical practice of this type. First, 
it might be expected that publishers would seek to defend their journalism and 
would be willing to defend intended meanings before the courts if called upon 
to do so. Hence, it might be expected that media organizations that valued their 
reputations for quality journalism would be loath to capitulate and to retract 
merely to avoid legal action. Moreover, it could be expected that the reputation of 
media organizations that regularly retracted willy-nilly would be correspondingly 
discounted by the wider public. The value of publishers’ reputations for accuracy 
and credibility might be expected to militate against abuses. Giving up space to 
highlight errors is not cost-free for media organizations, either in financial or 
reputational terms.
80. UK, HL & HC, Legislative Scrutiny: Defamation Bill (HL Paper 84/HC 810) (London: The 
Stationary Office, 2012) at paras 29-34 [Legislative Scrutiny]. Ironically, in its response to 
the Northern Irish consultation the MLA offered a version of this criticism. It complained 
that by “offering publishers a ‘cheap get out’ for making prompt apologies, the scheme 
ignores the importance and public interest in defending claims for libel in appropriate cases.” 
See Andrew Scott, supra note 11 at para 3.58. The argument was that the proposal would 
incentivize publishers not to defend proper, responsible and accurate publications. The 
obvious rejoinder is that the scheme is designed precisely to facilitate publishers in defending 
proper, responsible and accurate publications. If publishers then elected not to do so, 
that is for them.
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In addition, it would not be open to a defendant to correct or retract all specific 
meanings that the statement complained of was capable of bearing. A publisher 
could not merely retract every specific meaning that was communicated by a 
complainant and thereby evade all liability. The publisher can be presumed to 
have intended to convey some meaning. If the attempt were made to correct or 
retract every capable specific meaning, the court would then treat the correction 
of one of those meanings as sitting outside the proposed scheme. As at present, 
that swift correction would become a factor to be taken into consideration in 
assessing the extent of harms caused.81
A second guard against the exploitation of the bar to the bringing of claims 
would be more hard-edged. This would involve the lifting of the bar where 
there is evidence of malice or an absence of good faith in the publication of the 
retraction or correction. It is not clear that such a disincentive would be necessary. 
In any event, there would continue to be the potential for a claim for malicious 
falsehood to be brought. In addition, any clear inadequacy in the correction or 
retraction afforded to the plaintiff would permit them to proceed to court.
C. GAMING THE SYSTEM: PLAINTIFFS
There is also room to be skeptical as to the likely response of plaintiffs and their 
lawyers to any introduction of the proposed reforms. The MLA was concerned 
that “the proposal would simply shift the focus of the legal disputes and indeed 
increase legal disputes about meaning, not diminish them.”82 It contended that 
the combined proposal “would encourage plaintiff’s lawyers to propose hyperbolic 
or unreasonable meanings which may be understood by a small proportion of the 
audience. … [S]uch meanings would actually give a plaintiff a cause of action 
where none existed previously.”83 It added that there would be disagreement over 
whether, in a given case, “there is a realistic distinction in the sting of different 
meanings sufficient to give a plaintiff a claim.”84 Elsewhere in its response, the 
MLA suggested that this uncertainty would lead to self-censorship.85 It imagined 
that the proposal “would have an enormous chilling effect on freedom 
of expression.”86
81. Under a scheme such as that in sections 1 and 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, this may itself 
preclude a finding that the publication was defamatory. See Defamation Act 2013, supra 
note 2, ss 1-2.
82. Scott, Summary of Consultation Responses, supra note 72 at 127.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid at 120.
86. Ibid at 123.
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The ‘fifty shades of grey’ that the MLA response supposes can be found in the 
interpretation of any statement that exists only in the minds of lawyers schooled 
in current defamation practice in which context obscurantist hairsplitting can 
be worthwhile.87 The ordinarily reasonable audiences for publications are not 
so pernickety. Indeed, elsewhere in its response, the MLA itself noted that the 
determination of meaning is “usually a binary exercise.”88 It is salutary that 
the common law rule on strengths of meaning exemplified in the Chase-levels 
involve only three options: the direct allegation of fact, the assertion of reasonable 
suspicion, and the suggestion of a need for an investigation.89 Of the three 
options, only the first two are generally deployed. Allegations usually mean only 
one thing or another, or possibly a third. It is also salutary that the MLA response 
did not illustrate its concerns in this respect.
Importantly, under the combined proposal, a publisher would need only to 
respond to meanings communicated in a notice of complaint from a prospective 
plaintiff. The meanings contended for by the plaintiff would be definitely set out. 
The bar to a claim on any meaning could be achieved by way of the publication 
of a correction or retraction on that meaning.
Should a plaintiff set out a hyperbolic or unreasonable meaning, one 
option would be for the publisher to obviate any potential liability by retracting 
or correcting that meaning, no doubt with an appropriate rhetorical flourish 
attached. Should the publisher choose instead simply to ignore any such meaning, 
liability would still almost certainly not ensue. An unreasonable or hyperbolic 
meaning is by definition not a meaning that would have been taken by significant 
proportions of a publication’s audience. As is currently the case, if a plaintiff 
pursued a claim on such a meaning, it would likely be struck out by a judge as not 
being capable. Alternatively, as courts—even without statutory intervention such 
as that reflected in section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013—require plaintiffs to 
show (at least a tendency to cause) serious or significant harm, the plaintiff would 
have to show that the obtuse meaning nonetheless caused serious damage.90
87. See Kenyon, Defamation, supra note 32. As well as evidencing lawyers’ tendency deliberately 
to complicate the issue of meaning to their client’s advantage, Kenyon’s research has 
shown that under the current common law the meanings pleaded by defendants are 
often left deliberately verbose and general, not because the lawyers wish to establish those 
meanings per se, but rather because the general meaning provides a wider gateway to 
evidence (ibid at 120).
88. Scott, Summary of Consultation Responses, supra note 72 at 120.
89. Parkes & Mullis, supra note 22 at paras 3.20-3.23.
90. See Defamation Act 2013, supra note 2, s 1.
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The MLA response also suggested that if the combined proposal was 
introduced, there would often be substantial disagreement over “whether there is 
a realistic distinction in the sting of different meanings sufficient to give a plaintiff 
a claim.”91 This suggestion seems strained. If there was marginal room in a given 
case to distinguish between a meaning proposed by a plaintiff and a meaning 
that the publisher wished to sustain, then this should be readily appreciable by 
the publisher (as it would be by anyone else). In retracting or correcting the 
former meaning, the publisher would be at liberty, first, to reassert the latter 
meaning, and secondly, to emphasize the plaintiff’s perceived semantic pedantry. 
It is difficult to imagine that any plaintiff would wish to highlight an allegation 
that could be sustained against themselves by complaining of some similar but 
marginally different meaning. Nor could it be expected that a judge would give 
anything other than short shrift to a plaintiff who sought to sustain a legal claim 
on the basis of a meaning that was only marginally different to one that had been 
corrected or retracted by the publisher. Again, serious harm from the marginally 
different meaning would have to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court.
D. JURISPRUDENTIAL CONCERNS: PRECLUSION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
One potential problem with any regime that involves the barring of claims is 
that, naturally, it can limit access to justice. A concern of this type was identified 
during the latter stages in the Parliamentary consideration of what became the 
Defamation Act 2013. Campaigners had proposed a defence that would operate 
to bar proceedings in respect of statements made in good faith on matters of 
public interest insofar as a prompt clarification or correction had been made 
with adequate prominence. The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights rejected this approach.92 It emphasized that a correction or retraction may 
sometimes not be sufficient to rectify the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Hence, 
with its bar on access to damages, the proposed defence would risk breaching the 
ECHR’s article 8 right to reputation.93 The unremedied harm envisaged by the 
Joint Committee was particular harm caused in the interim between the times 
when publication and correction occurred. It is not an unreasonable assumption 
that any general harm to reputation might be in large part addressed through 
the swift publication of a correction or retraction. Ultimately, therefore, this 
91. Scott, Summary of Consultation Responses, supra note 72 at 127.
92. Legislative Scrutiny, supra note 81 at 29-34.
93. See generally Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221, Rome, 
4.XI.1950 (1950) at (entered into force 3 September 1953).
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fear of susceptibility to challenge under rights charters suggests no more than 
that a prompt and prominent correction or retraction should not create a bar to 
proceedings where the plaintiff intends to prove special damages.
E. PRACTICAL RESERVATIONS: UNCERTAINTY OVER PROMPTNESS AND 
PROMINENCE
Alongside conceptual issues, some practical matters would also need to be 
considered before any introduction of the proposed reform. A perennial complaint 
about the use of discursive remedies is that they can “add insult to injury” 
(especially if the publisher is left to determine what is said, and how it will be 
presented).94 There is clearly room for debate on how the concepts of promptness 
and prominence should be understood. The MLA envisaged “extensive disputes 
and litigation about whether a publication has been sufficiently prompt and 
prominent.”95 These would be matters ultimately to be decided by a judge who 
would be required to take all the circumstances of the case into account in making 
their assessment. The exercise of this discretion could be tightly controlled, 
however, by way of norm-setting, statutory guidance from the legislator.
Where European jurisdictions use discursive remedies, it is normal for them 
to be available very soon after the original publication. Hence, it can be suggested 
that a correction or retraction should be made within seven days of the receipt of 
a complaint regarding the original publication insofar as the complaint set out 
the complained of meanings in an intelligible fashion.96 The MLA response to 
the consultation asserted that this thinking “demonstrates a lack of appreciation 
for the inevitable complexity of libel disputes and the time which it often takes 
to properly and thoroughly investigate complaints.”97 It added that “even large 
and well-resourced media organizations may require a significant period of time 
to consider properly and respond to complaints.”98 The upshot, it was supposed, 
would be that publishers would be obliged “significantly [to] increase their 
94. A complaint of this nature was made, for example, by the parents of the abducted child 
Madeleine McCann regarding the handling of their dispute with the Sunday Times. See Gerry 
McCann, “Leveson has changed nothing—the media still put ‘stories’ before the truth,” The 
Guardian (2 October 2014), online: <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/02/
leveson-gerry-mccann-media-stories-before-truth> [perma.cc/MZD9-S22M].
95. Scott, Summary of Consultation Responses, supra note 72 at 127.
96. How the prospective plaintiff and the defendant-publisher should interact, and what was 
required of each party could easily be prescribed in a pre-action protocol for defamation.
97. Scott, Summary of Consultation Responses, supra note 72 at 128.
98. Ibid.
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reliance on lawyers given the draconian consequences which could follow from 
failing to apologise promptly.”99
On the contrary, this contention illustrated either a preference for hyperbole 
and obfuscation or the failure of the authors of the MLA response to understand 
the nature of the proposed scheme. In the case of a complaint from the subject of 
a publication, there would be no need for a publisher or its lawyers to investigate 
the complaint. All that would be required would be that the publisher reread 
the statement complained of in its context, and then determine, first, whether 
the publication was capable of bearing the meaning attributed to it, and second, 
whether it had been intended to convey that meaning. The first exercise would 
take no more than moments. The second may involve an interchange with a 
journalist or author, and an editor. If it was considered that the meaning was 
capable but unintended, then a correction or retraction would absolve the 
publisher of potential liability. It is difficult to see what complexity could require 
more than a relatively cursory assessment and engagement with colleagues. 
If the meaning was capable and intended, it would then be for the publisher to 
determine how to proceed. At that stage, the complaint would move beyond the 
proposed scheme and there would need to be an investigation and perhaps the 
preparation a defence. Notably, however, this exercise would already be based 
upon a single given meaning.
The issue of prominence may be more problematic. It is sometimes argued 
that corrections or retractions should be published in a manner commensurate 
with the original publication of erroneous or ambiguous content. It is clearly 
undesirable and disproportionate, however, that routine publication by a media 
organization should be swamped—or even significantly affected—by the need 
to correct or retract prior inaccuracies. Only in the truly exceptional case could 
it ever be appropriate to expect a broadcaster to dedicate scarce time in a news 
programme or a newspaper publisher to allocate front-page space to the making 
of corrections or retractions.
A degree of realism must dictate what it is appropriate to expect in the 
normal case. Different rules of thumb might be established by statute regarding 
different media, subject to the overall discretion of the court. In cases where 
the publisher enjoyed limited capacity to provide an adequate correction or 
retraction directly to the recipients of the original publication on account of 
the absence of any continuing engagement with the audience, such as where the 
defamatory statement was included in a hard copy book, the publisher might be 
expected to make relatively more expansive use of web pages and social media. 
99. Ibid.
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Indeed, in the general case webpages and online social media could be used to 
provide a low cost, but pervasive means of ensuring that persons who might have 
received the original publication might subsequently also receive the clarification. 
They would also allow a plaintiff to point to the clarification in future to rebut 
repeated erroneous claims in much the same way as substantial money damages 
and declarations in open court are perceived to do at present.
More often, it should be immediately possible for a publisher to make a 
correction or retraction in an equivalent form to that in which the original 
defamation appeared. As a starting point, a correction or retraction in a newspaper 
or periodical could be made either on the front page or a well-signposted editorial 
column; a correction in an online platform could be placed on a website’s 
homepage or prominently-linked from there. In any circumstance where there 
was concern over the capacity of a publisher to give sufficient prominence to 
a correction or retraction, provision might be made for a defendant to make a 
statement in open court in accordance with the fundamental principle that justice 
should be done. Ultimately, however, a publisher who was found by a judge to 
have published the retraction or correction without sufficient prominence would 
face liability before the court as insufficiently corrected errors on all capable 
meanings would be actionable. Hence, the incentive would always be to afford 
an objectively reasonable degree of prominence.
F. PRACTICAL RESERVATIONS: OVER-BURDENING PUBLISHERS
A further practical matter prompted the MLA to deride the scheme in the 
Northern Irish consultation as “highly impractical.”100 It forewarned that “[t]he 
proposed scheme … would lead to newspapers and news bulletins being filled 
with articles and packages correcting or apologising for meanings which were not 
intended.”101 Indeed, the MLA considered that the combined proposal would 
entail “draconian consequences,” and that these consequences would severely 
and improperly impact on editorial and journalistic functions and would chill 
freedom of expression.102
In some measure, this concern is addressed through the imposition of 
only realistic expectations of the prominence to be afforded to corrections and 
retractions. There is also the question of the burden imposed on publishers who 
are asked very often to respond to requests for corrections or retractions. To some 
extent, the proposed reforms would occasion a move away from regulation of 
100. Ibid at 127.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid at 128.
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publishers by way of a small number of ‘nuclear’ defamation actions towards 
a system of mundane self-correction. The complaint can be read, therefore, 
as a preference for the winner-takes-all courtroom drama to the prospect of 
‘death by a thousand cuts.’ That is understandable. It not clear, however, why 
public policy should take such machination into account, nor that it should seek 
to privilege publishers who prove themselves less than assiduous in avoiding the 
potential for harm to be caused through under-edited publication.
G. PRACTICAL RESERVATIONS: DIFFICULTY IN THE ASSESSMENT OF 
DAMAGES
A final criticism of the proposed reforms is that it would create difficulty in the 
determination of the level of damages in cases where alternative meanings were 
discernible, but only one meaning was litigated. Evidence would be required 
to determine the proportion of an audience that had understood the statement 
complained of in the various capable ways, and therefore to assess the corresponding 
quantum of damages. These are valid points; such issues would indeed arise in 
some cases. This complaint does comprise, however, a transparent instance of 
the tail wagging the dog. Such cases would seldom arise. In general, it might 
be expected that publishers would defend only mainstream, clear, obvious, and 
intended meanings. Should such a case arise, it would not be beyond the wit of 
a court to ascribe relative likelihoods to the range of possible interpretations that 
might be drawn from a given publication, nor to attribute quantum of harm to 
the different meanings recognized. Moreover, the law already has developed rules 
governing such situations, and judges can be expected to manage such tail-end 
argumentation sensibly.
III. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
This article opens with a line from Shakespeare. It might be summarized by 
paraphrasing another: “[F]irst … let’s kill all the [libel] lawyers.”103 Or rather, 
in this more accommodating time, let us act so as to reduce unnecessary 
complexity and ultimately to obviate the need for a specialized and expensive 
defamation bar. If the semantic dimension of defamation disputes can be excised, 
then the task of the court becomes merely the much more familiar function 
of distinguishing truth from falsity. That is a task undertaken daily in every 
103. William Shakespeare, Henry VI, II.IV.ii.73. In the play, contrary to the intention of the 
character into whose mouth it was placed, the line was used by the playwright in fact to 
affirm and laud the contribution to justice in society made by lawyers and judges.
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minor court and tribunal across the land in determining other public, civil, and 
criminal law disputes. The simplification and narrowing of the legal dispute that 
the combined proposal would achieve, perhaps if coupled with an intelligible 
revision of the law of fair comment, would mean that defamation disputes too 
could sensibly be shifted down to subordinate courts.104
The MLA response to the Northern Irish consultation offered a smorgasbord 
of reasons why any legislator should not proceed with the combined proposal. 
Some of the arguments presented by the MLA focused attention on matters 
of crucial importance. The breadth of the complaints offered and the mutual 
incompatibility between some of them suggested, however, that its authors had 
not fully appreciated the nature of the scheme proposed or that the response 
was strategic in character, or both. In some respects, the arguments set out were 
strained. In other respects, they strained credulity.
It can be surmised that the real concern underpinning the MLA response 
was twofold. The first consideration was essentially local in character: That any 
concession in terms of the making of corrections or retractions to satisfy the 
requirements of Northern Irish law may weaken a publisher’s litigation strategy 
in the much larger English jurisdiction, given that the same publication could 
easily generate litigation in both places. This is a natural response, and it is 
unfortunate that a version of the proposal was not fully considered in the reform 
debate in England.
The second key concern may have been that, as noted in Part II(E), above, 
the proposed reforms would occasion a move away from regulation of publishers 
by way of a small number of nuclear defamation actions towards a system of 
mundane self-correction. It too is understandable. Media publishers quite 
naturally recoil from the prospect of washing their dirty linen in public. The 
proposal discussed in this article would precipitate a profound cultural shift in 
the post-publication practices of recurrent publishers. That shift would place a 
distinct emphasis on the role of the media in providing the first draft of history. 
It would require a broader cultural appreciation, however, that they can offer 
only the first draft. That they can be expected, must be expected, to deliver only 
partial, fallible, preliminary versions of the truth.
104. See Jason Bosland, Andrew T Kenyon & Sophie Walker, “Protecting Inferences of Fact in 
Defamation Law: Fair Comment and Honest Opinion” (2015) 74 Cambridge LJ 234; Mullis 
& Scott, supra note 6 at 96-98.
